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When Cambodia gained independence from France in late 1953, the country's economy was
overwhelmingly agricultural. By 1962, eighty-one percent of the productive population was still
engaged in agriculture, and sixty-five percent of the productive population were rice
cultivators.(FN1) Mechanization was almost nonexistent and fertilizers were expensive.
Cambodian peasants utilized a variety of methods to overcome a scarcity of labor in the
production process, including cooperative, reciprocal labor arrangements.
Though Khmer peasants utilized reciprocal labor arrangements to overcome scarcity in the
means of production, these arrangements were temporary agreements between households rather
than permanent social structures. The agricultural economy was based on the family unit, which
was the only clearly defined social grouping in rural Cambodia. Khmer villages had no formal
associations, such as religious cults. The only social networks in the community other than blood
and affective kin networks were cooperative work teams "organized primarily for agricultural
labor at certain stages of the rice cultivation cycle when the household alone could not supply
enough manpower."(FN2)
Peasants with financial needs sought out private moneylenders or rice brokers and either
borrowed rice (if they had a deficit caused by a small harvest), borrowed money, or occasionally
sold property. Bank credit was unavailable in rural Cambodia in the 1950s and 1960s. Nearly all
short-term credit given by private banks went to commercial enterprises, instead of agricultural
or industrial production. The 1963 nationalization of the country's banking system by
Cambodia's ruler, Prince Sihanouk, did not alleviate peasants' need for credit, and the state's
Royal Cooperative Office (OROC), designed to provide low-interest loans to cooperative
farmers, was "inefficient, if not blatantly corrupt."(FN3)
Because fellow villagers usually did not produce enough of a surplus to extend loans in kinds,
peasants commonly borrowed money to purchase rice for food or inputs needed for next year's
harvest. Loans were repaid in rice. Peasants usually required loans prior to the harvest, when the
purchase price of rice was high, and were forced to repay the loan after the harvest, when market
prices for rice were relatively low. Interest averaged ten percent per month, and land was used as
collateral.
The lender usually designated which parcel was mortgaged, and normally selected the
borrower's most productive land.(FN4) Though debt was common, complete loss of land was
infrequent. Peasants normally paid off their debt after one year, but often borrowed again to
compensate for shortages caused by repayment of the previous loan or a bad harvest. This
process resulted in an endless cycle of debt for many peasants, which pushed them closer toward
the limits of subsistence. Delvert found that in different provinces indebted farmers ranged from
ten to seventy-eight percent of the peasant population in 1956.(FN5) A colonial survey
conducted in 1952 reported that nationwide, seventy-five percent of Cambodian peasants were
significantly indebted.(FN6)
Widespread debt during the 1950s and 1960s did not create a large rural landless population

exploited by feudal-style landlords. Data indicates a decrease in per household landholdings
between 1930 and the early 1960s, but not a definitive trend toward landlessness, especially in
comparison with Viet Nam during the same period. Some peasants became landless during this
period, but concentration of landholdings mainly occurred among "middle peasants" owning
between one and five hectares. Land ownership did not become consolidated in the hands of a
minority of rich landowners.
Prud'homme concluded in 1969 that gross agricultural production in Cambodia had increased
greatly since the turn of the century because of the expansion of cultivated areas. Rice yields
remained constant at approximately one ton per hectare, one of the lowest rates in the world. By
1966, Cambodia's per capita agricultural productivity was only 87% of 1960 levels. Furthermore,
rice production and land area under cultivation did not expand as rapidly as the country's
population.(FN7) One cause of decreased productivity was the increased parcellization of land;
as far back as 1950, a rural household's land was distributed over an average of 7.22 plots.(FN8)
Another productivity loss was caused by debt. High levels of debt among subsistence producers
prevented any capital investment in agricultural production. Peasants became caught in a vice as
land holdings decreased, parcellization and debt rose, and production per household plummeted.
Rural economic problems translated into a general decline in agricultural production after
1964. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the years 1960 to 1967, national per capita labor
productivity and crop yields for rice cultivation declined precipitously after 1964.(FN9) How did
such a decline affect the Cambodian state? During the 1960s, the primary sources of Cambodia's
foreign exchange were exports of rice and rubber, which together composed 82% of Cambodia's
exports by value in 1964. By 1966, rice exports had declined 60% in terms of both tonnage and
value. The value of the country's rubber exports began dropping in 1965. The result was a drastic
worsening in Cambodia's trade deficit.(FN10)
When exports declined and deficit spending grew, the government attempted unsuccessfully to
increase extractions from the countryside. In 1966, one year prior to armed action by members of
the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), the state created a collection system to purchase as
much rice as possible through government channels because of the large amount being lost to
export through black-market sale to Vietnamese communist forces. That year an estimated
130,000 tons of rice had been sold by peasants to the Vietnamese National Liberation Front,
while 170,000 tons were exported legally.(FN11) The government collection campaign was
enforced with army units and prices offered by the state were as low as one-third of the black
market price.(FN12) In addition, the government presence in the countryside, as measured by the
size and effectiveness of rural development programs, began to decrease. For example, after
growing from 83 million to 385 million riels between 1955 and 1962, the government's
expenditures on public health declined in real terms.(FN13) Rural development, as measured by
indicators such as infant mortality rates, remained low.
After Cambodia gained independence in 1953, its state was relatively weak. There were few
effective political linkages between the government and the country's rural population. Though
Prince Sihanouk, as the head of the government, was immensely popular with peasants as a
political leader, stable political institutions that incorporated this popularity into legitimacy for
the state itself did not exist. Political participation at the village level was effectively limited to
voting in elections for village chiefs and representatives to the national assembly. The electoral
process in practical terms was meaningless. Village chiefs had no articulation to national
political institutions, and national assembly members were "vague and remote" individuals
whose candidacies were vetted by Sihanouk.(FN14) Cambodian peasants had no institutional

means of affecting government policies.
The politico-economic consequences of a deteriorating rural economy were twofold. The state
became parasitic, gobbling up foreign aid to cover operating expenditures, which prevented any
aid from being used for long-term development. Simultaneously, the worsening economic
situation experienced by Cambodia's peasants was easily converted into political opposition. As
Kiernan states, in reference to the 1967 armed uprising in the town of Samlaut, the increasing
impoverishment of peasants created a "vast reservoir of peasant unrest that lacked only a
reasonably sophisticated leadership."(FN15) This leadership was provided by communist forces
(both Khmer and Vietnamese) which capitalized on the state's political and economic weakness
in the countryside by rapidly taking control of peasant agricultural production in most areas of
the country.
After 1970, the state's remaining political support among peasants rapidly disintegrated as
bombing drove millions of farmers from their fields into urban areas and the Khmer Rouge and
Vietnamese communist insurgencies eliminated government military forces from the
countryside. By 1973, the very existence of the Khmer Republic depended on the continued
applications of U.S. B-52 strikes.(FN16) The states was totally dependent on foreign aid. Once
the Khmer Rouge cut supply lines to Phnom Penh, the war was over, and a new state,
Democratic Kampuchea (DK), arose out of the ashes of Cambodia.
The leadership of the DK regime professed the goal of creating a purely egalitarian
agricultural society by leaping all intermediary stages of socialist evolution. What resulted was a
society composed of slave labor, state appropriation of agricultural produce, and death. As aptly
put by Vickery, "rationality seems to have been overridden by political and ideological choice"
in Democratic Kampuchea.(FN17) All phases of agricultural production were controlled by the
state. Cities were emptied and money was abolished. Household agricultural production was
eliminated; agricultural labor was collectivized into cooperatives composed of as many as three
thousand people.
Peasants and inexperienced former urban residents planted and harvested crops under the
supervision of armed cadre, who then sent produce to locations specified by DK administrators
for stockpiling. Though cadre remained well-fed, peasants were forced to survive on inadequate
amounts of food. As the DK regime progressed, life in most parts of the country grew harsher.
Food rations for the population were decreased and by 1977 communal meals consisted of rice
gruel. Reduced food rations, hard labor, lack of medical care, and the "apparent targeted
slaughter of adults" resulted in the deaths of approximately 1.05 million Cambodians during the
DK period.(FN18)
The state, under the direction of a small group of Khmer Rouge leaders, attempted to liquidate
what were perceived as past, present and potential future enemies of the central authorities. Often
this included peasants. In the DK's final period, massive purges directed from the Pol Potcontrolled center destroyed a significant portion of the state's regional administrative structure,
and approximately 100,000 cadre, soldiers, and peasants from the DK's Eastern Zone died
through starvation and execution in a little over six months.(FN19)
The Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia on 25 December 1978, and the DK regime rapidly
collapsed. Phnom Penh was taken on 7 January, and a new government, the Kampuchean
People's Revolutionary Council (KPRC), was formed. The KPRC was composed of former DK
cadres from the Eastern Zone who had broken away from Pol Pot, Vietnamese-trained members
of the CPK, and other Cambodians sympathetic to the new government. The KPRC soon evolved
into the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), controlled by the Khmer People's

Revolutionary Party (KPRP).
In early 1979, the PRK was faced with the economic wreckage left by the DK regime and a
hungry population. Armed opponents of the PRK, including the Khmer Rouge, continued
fighting in parts of the country. Cambodians migrated to their former homes in search of
relatives and consumed the large quantities of rice stockpiled in abandoned DK storage facilities.
In other areas, retreating DK military units destroyed any food supplies they could not move with
them. Regular rice planting and cultivation was not extensive and the wet-season rice crop
produced only 285,000 tons on 700,000 hectares of land.(FN20)
The top priority of the PRK was thus the revival of agricultural production. In 1979 the
government nationalized all land and tried to collectivize production. In such a chaotic situation,
the government's land policy offered the potential benefit of land security for peasants: land
could not be sold or transferred for repayment of debt, and the state controlled the country's
financial system. Traditional forms of usury were effectively blocked.
Agricultural production was organized around krom samaki, communal production groups.
Though similar in name, they operated differently from the massive collectivization that
occurred during the DK period. Krom samaki were usually composed of between ten to fifteen
families. Krom samaki leaders, appointed by khum (subdistrict) and village level officials,
distributed land to individual households on an informal basis.(FN21) In many locations the local
administration merely ratified ex post facto the farming of land that peasants had settled upon
after the collapse of the DK. In other locations, where land from the initial distribution to
peasants was insufficient, the state specified that land not being communally farmed by the krom
samaki should be assigned to cooperative members for household production.
Theoretically the krom samaki was based on collective production, with output divided among
households on the basis of the manual and draught animal labor each member contributed to
production. A work point system, outlined by the PRK in August 1980, allocated communal
production according to the number of days worked. A certain amount of the production from
each krom samaki was to be set aside for state personnel, primarily local-level authorities and
military forces.
Also in August 1980, the KPRC adopted a resolution specifying the importance of the "family
economy" in agricultural production. To augment family incomes and to supplement diets, each
household, regardless of size, was to receive 800-2,000 m[sup2 as a private garden plot.(FN22)
The government announcement also stated that a portion of the food produced in the krom
samaki should be sold to the state in exchange for agricultural implements and consumer goods.
Apparently PRK leaders regarded communal production as too low for industrial use or for
feeding the urban population, and "tried to encourage increased voluntary production and sale of
surpluses for the secondary and tertiary sectors" of the Cambodian economy.(FN23)
By 1983, PRK government documents classified krom samaki into three categories. In Level
One krom samaki, all means of production were collectivized and yield shared on a work-point
basis after payment of collective debts and taxes. Draught animals remained the property of
individual families. In Level Two krom samaki, land was divided and farmed by family units.
After-tax production was not appropriated by the cooperative but kept within the household.
Labor-intensive tasks, such as plowing, transplanting or harvesting were performed collectively.
Level Three krom samaki contained family-based groupings with all labor and material inputs
provided by the family; outputs were sold privately and not through the krom samaki. Informal
labor exchange occurred between family members and neighbors.
Workpoints, used to calculate returns to peasants from cooperative production were based on

the time, rather than effort, spent cultivating communal land. The krom samaki lacked a
mechanism to distinguish the quality of labor performed in the cooperative, and peasants did not
have a guaranteed return on their labor. Farmers concentrated on cultivating private plots, the
produce of which could be sold privately. Though central and provincial authorities existed to
purchase rice at numerous locations, peasants could sell to private markets as they wished.
Government controls on interprovincial travel prevented private trading on a national scale for
most of the 1980s, but at the local level non-state markets could operate. Collectivized
production within the krom samaki became a function of the availability of draught animals and
other means of production, which in some localities "would have in any case imposed
cooperative labor."(FN24) Often krom samaki leaders provided false data to the government to
gain access to state-subsidized agricultural inputs, which were in turn sold to households by local
authorities.
The PRK created a credit mechanism in an attempt to generate surplus production which could
be acquired by the state. The national bank extended loans to khum administrations for state
purchase of rice produced in krom samaki collectives. The khum administrations could sell
manufactured consumer goods through state shops to repay the loans to the central government.
However, Cambodia's factories were still mostly inoperable and goods produced by statecontrolled industry did not exist. By 1985, industry accounted for only five percent of
Cambodia's GDP, compared with nearly twenty percent in 1970.(FN25) State stores offered only
a few goods and peasants had little incentive to buy them. The failure of the state to recoup
agricultural outlays explains 1984 figures obtained from the national bank, which stated that out
of 18 million riels loaned to Kandal provincial commerce offices for the purchase of rice, only 8
million riels had been repaid.(FN26)
By the end of 1985, communal production was nearly non-existent. At the Ninth Party Plenum
on 30 August 1984, the KPRP passed a resolution to give village and khum officials land plots
for tillage so that they no longer depended on food received from communal krom samaki
production. The resolution was included in a decree on land management by the Council of
Ministers on 6 May 1985. To acquire the plots specified by the central government, local
officials redistributed land. Because this gave cadre a source of income independent from
production from the krom samaki, local officials no longer had an incentive to enforce
communal production, and communal land was parcelled out to individual peasant households.
Peasant agricultural production in 1985 was still at subsistence levels, constrained by the
scarcity of inputs. There were only 1.2 million draught animals for plowing in 1985, compared
with 2 million in 1969. New land had been brought under cultivation during the 1980s, but the
total cultivated area was substantially less than the amount farmed in the 1960s. In 1969,
approximately 2.5 million hectares were cultivated in Cambodia; the most land cultivated under
the PRK was close to 1.8 million hectares.(FN27) To feed its growing bureaucracy and military,
the state periodically increased its purchase price for rice, but there were no corresponding
increases in production.
The PRK also attempted to compensate for low rice sales to the state through taxation, which
began in 1983. The taxes were collected by provincial administrations, which were controlled by
the Cambodian military. Euphemistically called "patriotic contributions," the taxes varied
according to land productivity. The Ministry of Agriculture set the tax at 120 kilograms of rice
per hectare for land producing more than two tons of rice, 100 kilograms per hectare on land
producing between one and two tons, and 80 kilograms per hectare on land that produced less
than one ton.(FN28) Patriotic contributions were to be paid in cash generated by the sale of rice

directly to the state for a fixed price or to the private market.
This agricultural tax rate, six to ten percent of production, compared favorably to the 1960s,
when peasants were subject to taxes, high interest payments on debt, and occasional forced
contributions to the state for development projects. But collection of patriotic contributions was
sporadic due to weakness of the government administration, especially when warfare against
rebel forces escalated in 1985. Cautious attempts to collect the tax resumed in 1987, but by 1988
the PRK had reduced the tax rate to half the 1983 level.(FN29)
Collectivization of the countryside as a means of increasing production proved impossible. By
1989, krom samaki existed only as convenient units of organizations for the purposes of taxation,
dissemination of government policy, and military recruitment. And despite impressive gains
compared with the early 1980s, the improvement in rice yields had tapered off to a level too
small to earn foreign exchange through exports. Food self-sufficiency for the country was not
guaranteed and in some years external food aid had been required to cover shortfalls in the
domestic rice harvest.
In December of 1987, peace talks began between the PRK and the resistance movements of
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in an attempt to reach a political
solution to the long-running guerrilla war in Cambodia. Viet Nam completed the withdrawal of
its army from Cambodia in September 1989, and the military forces of the CGDK were expected
to increase their attacks against the government army to bolster their position in peace
negotiations.
The PRK soon came under additional pressure from a reduction in foreign aid. The Soviet
Union supplied Cambodia with approximately US$130 million in annual aid during the latter
1980s, and between eighty and eighty-five percent of Cambodia's trade was conducted with
Soviet bloc countries, funded via Soviet import credits. In 1989, Cambodia imported 111 million
rubles (US$200 million) worth of commodities from socialist countries, which included basic
items such as fertilizer, oil, cement and steel. Exports were valued at only 27 million rubles.
With the disintegration of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the
massive economic aid that had helped to support the PRK bagan to disappear. In 1990, the Soviet
government informed the PRK that by the beginning of 1991, Cambodia would "have to pay for
Soviet goods in hard currency."(FN30) When the Soviet aid pipeline was shut down, the
government deficit was covered through the printing of money, which raised inflation.
The failure of government policy to move peasants from subsistence to state-appropriated
surplus production, when coupled with the drastic decline in foreign economic and military aid,
presented PRK leaders with a choice: liberalize the economy to stimulate agricultural production,
and thereby build peasant support and revenue opportunities, or collapse. The leadership of the
PRK chose to initiate a program of economic reform. Government policies bagan to introduce
private property and other aspects of a free market economy. The PRK was renamed the State of
Cambodia (SoC), though the government remained a one-party socialist state. Economic reform
appeared to some observers as a KPRP attempt to "improve the government's popular appeal...
following a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict."(FN31)
On 11 February 1989, Cambodia's National Assembly approved changes to the country's
constitution which declared that peasants had usufruct and inheritance rights to land that was
theoretically the property of the state. The amended Article 15 of the constitution stated that
citizens enjoy the full right to occupy and utilize new lands, and have the right to inherit
landed property distributed by the state for housing and exploitation.(FN32)
The state's policy change was emphasized at the Second National Conference of Cadres of the

KPRP in April. During his opening speech, Chea Sim, politburo member and chairman of the
National Assembly, declared that the objective of the Conference was "to strive to accelerate the
cause of socioeconomic restoration and development."(FN33) Conference resolutions delineated
three separate types of land rights that could be given to peasants: ownership, possession and
concession. Peasants received the right to own land occupied by dwellings. Agricultural land that
had been cultivated for one year by households after state distribution qualified for possession
rights. Concession rights applied to other types of land for a limited period of time.
These possession rights were declared by the government to be inheritable. Though krom
samaki continued to exist for administrative purposes, new government policies made no
mention of collective production. Resolutions spoke of krom samaki provas day, solidarity
groups which operated on the basis of mutual aid and traditional forms of cooperative labor. The
1989 resolutions were popular among the peasants, mainly because the reforms were interpreted
as granting peasants the right to own land. Only twelve percent of the krom samaki contained
collectivized land at the beginning of 1989, but even these cooperatives were dissolved, and
farming returned to traditional mutual aid or private systems throughout Cambodia.
The KPRP released an amended Cambodian constitution in May of 1989 that confirmed the
legality of private ownership of property and free markets. The constitution's article 18 stated
that "the private property of the people concerning gains from their labor, legitimate gains, and
other legitimate property is protected by law." Article 19 stated that "citizens or production units
can sell their products."(FN34)
However, statements by the KPRP leadership were often contradictory. The government's land
ownership policy remained confusing during economic liberalization. In a statement in June of
1990, the government obscured the issue by declaring that:
This policy on tenure and utilization of land clearly states: All land in the State of Cambodia
are (sic) state property. On the granting of rights to ownership of land, the state shall reallocate
land occupied since liberation day on 7 January 1979 in conformity with the cadastral
regulations... In the current period when the law on land ownership is not yet issued, the state has
decided to issue a temporary land ownership certificate to the public.(FN35)
When liberalization was introduced by the state, economic problems in the agricultural sector
initially intensified. Very few of Cambodia's rice-growing areas were irrigated, causing an
almost total dependence on rain for a successful crop. State assistance to farmers ended, and
often state agricultural goods that had been distributed to krom samaki were abandoned.
Approximately 600 of the 1,600 tractors the PRK had received as foreign aid during the 1980s
were unserviceable because of the lack of spare parts.(FN36) In 1990, farmers could only afford
to purchase ten thousand kilograms of fertilizer, only about twelve percent of the amount needed
according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization.(FN37) Despite these economic
problems, most Cambodians were eager to have production fully under private control.
Because national multiparty elections were part of the political settlement to the Cambodian
war, the KPRP was aware of the need to maintain popular support, and the ruling party continued
to promote privatization of peasant agriculture. At the national party congress in October 1991,
the KPRP changed its name to the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) to reflect the political shift
away from socialism. The congress adopted a party platform that reaffirmed the government's
goal of a free market economy, and that also sought to assuage peasant concerns about the
security of land cultivation rights.
In 1993, elections sponsored by the United Nations were held. Though boycotted by the
Khmer Rouge, a multiparty political system was established. Election results produced a

coalition goverment led by the CPP and FUNCINPEC, the political organization led by Prince
Ranaridh, son of Cambodia's former ruler Sihanouk, Ranaridh shares the position of prime
minister with Hun Sen of the CPP, and Sihanouk has regained the title of King of Cambodia as a
constitutional monarch.
What was the performance of Cambodia's agricultural sector during the PRK/SoC period from
1980 to 1992? As shown in Figure 1, after rising dramatically from below 1.0 ton per hectare in
1983, rice yields have hovered near 1.3 tons per hectare since 1986. Using population data from
a Cambodian government survey conducted in 1982, and assuming a baseline population of 6.5
million in 1980, national labor productivity in rice cultivation is calculated at a fairly constant
0.25 tons per capita from 1986 to 1992, shown in Figure 2.(FN38) During this period, rice
production was the dominant sector in Cambodia's economy; in 1992, rice production accounted
for a higher proportion of Cambodia's GDP than any other productive activity, including
wholesale and retail trade, the entire industrial sector, forestry, and livestock.(FN39) Rice
cultivation is still the basis for livelihood for the majority of Cambodia's population.
However, peasants continued to produce rice at subsistence levels, and the country often
required external food aid after 1980 to compensate for deficits in the rice harvest. The absence
of surplus rice production during the 1980s deprived the PRK/SoC of Cambodia's largest pre-war
source of export earnings. Peasant indebtedness to moneylenders reappeared under the PRK,
though not at levels comparable to those of the 1960s, and the state was unable to provide
investment capital to the agricultural sector. By some standards, Cambodia's economy was in
worse shape during the 1980s than it was prior to 1970. In April 1989, the PRK's deputy premier
stated that Cambodia's GNP in 1989 was estimated to be only eighty percent of 1969's, and that
per capita income was lower due to the corresponding increase in population.(FN40)
Are present rural conditions different from those during the 1960s? Economic and political
reforms, begun in 1989, have not created yet a sound economy and acceptable living conditions
for the majority of Cambodians. Approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of Cambodia's
population continues to live in rural areas, mostly household cultivators, but food security for
peasants is not guaranteed. Since the 1993 elections, Cambodia has suffered annual food deficits
in varying regions. Following disastrous flooding and drought in 1994, the director of World
Food Programme operations in Cambodia stated that the national shortfall in rice for that year
was 150,000 metric tons, and in 1995, rice shortages were projected to reach 300,000 metric
tons.(FN41) Cambodia's population growth rate is high, estimated by various sources as being
between 2.6 and 3.2 percent. Because of the labor-intensive nature of Cambodian agriculture,
and the scarcity of labor caused by the high death rate during the Khmer Rouge period, one
would expect the additional labor provided by population growth to have a positive effect on the
agricultural economy. Yet production is stagnant.
The International Monetary Fund found that Cambodia's rice production in 1993 was 9.8 per
cent less than the annual average rice production for the years 1963 to 1967, with a population
approximately 1.5 million greater.(FN42) Figure 1 shows that rice yields after 1984 are higher
than those during the 1960s. However, per capita productivity is as much as sixty percent less
during the same time periods, as shown by Figure 2. The paradox of lower average per capita
productivity and higher yields is explained by the decrease in land area cultivated: in 1967,
Cambodia had 0.3865 hectares under rice cultivation per capita; in 1992 the amount is only
0.1991 hectares cultivated per capita. Although yields are higher after 1985 than in the 1960s by
as much as thirty percent, the land area cultivated is one-third less. Expansion of cultivated area
is constrained by such factors as infertile soils requiring fertilizers, which most cultivators cannot

afford to purchase, the lack of functioning irrigation systems, and the continuing danger of
landmines in many parts of the country.
Because rice cultivation determines the income level of the largest portion of Cambodia's
population, the absence of marketable surpluses will restrain Cambodia's overall economic
growth. Perhaps more importantly, persistent agricultural problems may lead to distinct socioeconomic polarization between an increasingly impoverished peasantry and an upwardly-mobile
tourism and service-based urban sector that is supported by the majority of foreign development
aid coming into the country. If increases in the rural population are not matched by increases in
labor demand (e.g., if new areas are not brought under cultivation), there will be a lower return to
labor in the agricultural sector and the economic situation of peasants will deteriorate.
This process is being facilitated by a breakdown in democratic institutions in the Cambodian
state, in which the economic needs of rural Cambodians are eclipsed by maneuvring among
Phnom Penh's political elite. The coalition created by the 1993 UN-sponsored elections,
composed of the CPP, FUNCINPEC and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), is
under pressure from factional infighting and personal rivalries. The BLDP has suffered a split
within its leadership between party president Son Sann, and Ieng Mouly, the government's
Minister of Information, who is supported by the CPP. This split is endangering the BLDP's
position within the government; on 30 September of this year, grenades were thrown into a
BLDP office in Phnom Penh during a party meeting, and an outdoor rally in support of Son Sann
held the next day was disrupted by military police. The rally had been banned by Hun Sen and
Prince Ranaridh.
The CPP and FUNCINPEC, while vying with each other, are attempting to eliminate voices of
opposition from within their own ranks. The most significant event has been the October 1994
ouster of Sam Rainsy from his position as finance minister. In June 1995, he was expelled from
FUNCINPEC, after which he was removed from his parliamentary seat. Rainsy ran afoul of the
government for criticizing corruption that exists at all levels of the state administration and
attempting to reform state financial practices. These and other recent activities have led Amnesty
International to conclude that individual politicians are at risk in Cambodia.(FN43) The
government has also made recent moves to clamp down on press freedom. Editors have been
arrested and jailed, and some newspapers critical of the government have been fined and forced
to cease publication.
The shifting political alliances among members of Cambodia's national government are
attempts to consolidate power prior to the next round of elections that are scheduled for 1998. If
the process continues, corruption will remain endemic, rural development programs will be
ignored, and the already weak economic linkages between the state and the countryside will
disintegrate further. Approximately forty-five percent of foreign development aid is consumed
within Phnom Penh, and the Cambodian state is already dependent on foreign aid for operating
revenue: eighty percent of the state budget is paid by external assistance. The combination of a
huge rural population struggling within a subsistence economy, and a corrupt, foreign-funded
government creates a weak economic foundation for a state's existence. It also can bring into
question the state's legitimacy among a peasantry distant from the political machinations
occurring in Phnom Penh.
The key variable in Cambodia's economy at the present time is whether economic reforms and
development programs will translate into increased agricultural productivity. If peasants become
able to produce a surplus for the market, they will be able to invest in agricultural inputs and in
bringing new land under cultivation. Should the agricultural sector remain at subsistence levels,

new land will not be brought under cultivation, the rural population will continue to increase, and
more peasants will be marginalized in a process similar to that which occurred in the 1960s.
Worsening economic conditions and the lack of institutional means to affect government policy
will cause the peasantry to look toward political alternatives to the current Cambodian state.
These political alternatives can easily take the form of peasant-based political organizations.
Though the Khmer Rouge lacks the military strength and popular support to stage a return to
political power, other opposition movements can form if peasant conditions do not improve.
Cambodia has a long history of armed organizations contesting the government's control of the
countryside.(FN44) A bloated, corrupt army cannot crush political opposition everywhere in
Cambodia, as proven by the continued survival of the Khmer Rouge. Challenges to the state
could arise from within the army itself. Government leaders already fear possible coup attempts
mounted by opposition factions. Because of the weak structure of the Cambodian state and the
fragile nature of the country's agrarian economy, the historical events of thirty years ago may
prove relevant to the current Cambodian government.
Added material
Figure 1: Cambodian Rice Yields
Figure 2: Cambodian Per Capita Rice Productivity
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